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Abstract. Society relies on infrastructure, but as infras-
tructure systems are often collocated and interdependent,
they are vulnerable to cascading failures. This study inves-
tigated cross-infrastructure and societal impacts of burst wa-
ter mains, with the hypothesis that multi-infrastructure fail-
ures triggered by burst water mains are more common in
sandy soils. When water mains in sandy soils burst, pres-
surised water can create subsurface voids and abrasive slur-
ries, contributing to further infrastructure failures. Three spa-
tial data investigations, at nested scales, were used to as-
sess the influence that soil sand content has on the frequency
and damage caused by burst water mains (1) to roads in the
county of Lincolnshire, (2) to other proximal water mains
in East Anglia and (3) to other proximal infrastructure and
wider society across England and Wales. These investiga-
tions used infrastructure network and failure data, media re-
ports and soil maps, and were supported by workshop dis-
cussions and structured interviews with infrastructure indus-
try experts. The workshop, interviews and media reports pro-
duced a greater depth of information on the infrastructure and
societal impacts of cascading failures than the analysis of
infrastructure data. Cross-infrastructure impacts were most
common on roads, built structures and gas pipes, and they
occurred at a higher rate in soils with very high sand con-
tents.
1 Introduction
The socio-economic and physical wellbeing of society is in-
creasingly dependent on infrastructure services (Lloyds Reg-
ister Foundation, 2015; Guikema, 2015; Defra, 2013). Infras-
tructure assets (e.g. pipes, cables, roads, substations, pump-
ing stations and buildings) are commonly co-located, so a
failure of one asset (e.g. a burst water main) may lead to
failures in proximal networks (e.g. damage to a road, and/or
flooding of gas networks). Complex infrastructure failures
can be cascading, be escalating or have a common cause
(Rinaldi et al. 2001). They can occur at a range of spatio-
temporal scales and affect both physical and socio-political
infrastructure.
Multi-infrastructure failures often result from a single fail-
ure in the crowded and heterogeneous array of co-located,
aged and modern, interconnected and semi-automated infras-
tructure systems (Pritchard et al. 2014a). These systems op-
erate with physical, geographic, functional, cyber, policy and
informational dependencies and interdependencies (Rinaldi
et al., 2001; Zimmerman, 2004; Dudenhoeffer et al., 2006).
These close relationships can make infrastructure vulnera-
ble to complex failures. Potential for the initial infrastructure
failure is influenced by both inherent infrastructure factors
(e.g. for water mains, these may include age, material, di-
ameter, joint technology, workmanship, co-location, pressure
management, investment) and environmental factors (e.g.
soil, vegetation, extreme or rapidly changing weather). Rapid
or extreme environmental changes often expose the vulnera-
bilities of aging and deteriorating infrastructure networks.
An example of how burst water mains can impact other in-
frastructure networks occurred in Matlock, Derbyshire, UK
(Appendix A; BBC, 2013a). Here, flooding from a burst
main closed two roads, disrupting transport across the city.
Escaping water formed a void under the road surface, into
which a water company van fell, fracturing a gas main. The
gas leak forced the evacuation of 25 homes, water and sedi-
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ment flooded the gas network and the County Hall suffered
flood damage (including to official records) and was closed
for days. This single burst damaged roads, gas networks and
buildings. It impacted government functions and required po-
lice and fire service resources. Whilst direct costs of this
complex failure totalled many tens of thousands of pounds,
indirect costs to society were much higher.
Risks to infrastructure assets represent a key strategic risk
for the water sector, and the heterogeneity of infrastructure
assets, networks and the soil environment, in which they are
buried, produces complexity for infrastructure operators and
regulators tasked with providing robust and resilient levels
of service (Rinaldi et al., 2001; Rogers et al., 2012; Chalker
et al., 2018). With the limited awareness amongst infrastruc-
ture asset managers of system-of-systems thinking, which is
rarely employed in asset risk assessments, and the limited
communication between operators, governments and regu-
lators, understanding of infrastructure interdependencies is
often lacking (Young and Hall, 2015; Defra, 2011; Jude et
al., 2017; Street et al., 2017; Committee on Climate Change,
2017). Indeed, the second UK Climate Change Risk As-
sessment (CCRA) identified cascading infrastructure fail-
ures as the highest risk facing UK infrastructure (Dawson
et al., 2016). Furthermore, the CCRA recommends greater
consideration of subsidence risks to infrastructure and im-
proved risk information sharing between infrastructure oper-
ators (Dawson et al., 2016).
One significant challenge associated with developing an
understanding of such infrastructure risks is that natural haz-
ards to the built environment have different frequencies, im-
pacts and spatio-temporal scales. In particular, whilst a con-
siderable body of literature exists surrounding acute environ-
mental hazards such as flooding (e.g. Bowering et al., 2014),
less research explores more complex, and often chronic,
forms of soil-related natural hazards and related infrastruc-
ture failures (Defra, 2011). Such hazards pose substantial
risks to infrastructure systems that may be currently under-
estimated by stakeholders. Because risk perception is often
linked to past experience (Taylor et al., 2014), the impact of
low-frequency events with moderate–high impacts may be
underestimated by infrastructure operators, as they may not
be high on organisations’ risk registers.
Soils support infrastructure, yet some soils are prone to
forms of ground movement including clay shrink–swell,
sand washout and peat shrinkage (Pritchard et al., 2014a;
2015a, b). While the process of clay-related soil movement is
relatively well understood, little is currently known about the
likelihood of complex infrastructure failures resulting from
water pipe bursts in soils with different sand contents. Of
particular concern are sandy soils with greater than 70 %
sand-sized particles (0.06–2 mm). Whilst sandy soils cover
less than 20 % of England and Wales, they are susceptible
to water-assisted erosional processes and are not uncommon
in some urban settings (Brink et al., 1982; Cranfield Univer-
sity, 2016). Thus, water escaping from buried pipes can form
voids, removing the structural support normally offered by
soil to infrastructure (bridging). In addition, sand and pres-
surised water can form abrasive slurries, which are highly
damaging to proximal plastic pipes (Majid et al., 2010).
This paper presents an interdisciplinary scoping study ex-
ploring the influence of sandy soils on the impacts of burst
water mains on physical infrastructure (electricity, natural
gas, water, wastewater, transport and telecoms), public ser-
vice infrastructure, (government, emergency services, health-
care and education) and wider socio-economic functions.
The hypothesis is that sandier soils are more likely to give
rise to multi-infrastructure failures due to their non-cohesive
structure (leading to void formation) and composition of
large, abrasive particles that, under the release of high pres-
sure water, can damage proximal infrastructure. A mixed-
methods approach is used to help understand the wide-
ranging impacts of these events. Four methods and multi-
ple sources of evidence are used. Discussion focuses on the
impacts of burst water mains on infrastructure systems and
wider society.
Three spatial data investigations, at nested scales, were
used to assess the influence that soil sand content has on
the frequency and level of damage caused by burst water
mains: (1) to overlying roads in the county of Lincolnshire
(2) to other proximal water mains in the region of East An-
glia and (3) to other proximal infrastructure and wider soci-
ety across England and Wales (Figs. 1 and 2). Lincolnshire is
found within East Anglia, which is in turn found within Eng-
land (Fig. 2). In addition, both a series of one-to-one inter-
views and a joint workshop with infrastructure practitioners
were used to elicit expert industry knowledge of the impact
of burst mains on infrastructure systems and wider society.
The choice of the different study areas was guided by the
availability of data of sufficient quality and quantity.
2 Data
This study required data on (1) the distribution of infrastruc-
ture networks, (2) the location of infrastructure failures and
(3) the related soil conditions. Nine datasets were collected
and used in exploratory data analysis, but only six were suf-
ficiently complete, consistent and coherent with the failure
mechanisms under investigation to warrant their inclusion in
the full study. Industry-provided datasets that were not used
included electrical faults data (which were sparse and lacked
accurate spatial location) and the sewer network data and
sewer failures data (which lacked accurate dates of failure,
and in addition, most failures reported were blockages, which
lack a strong mechanistic link to burst water mains). The flow
of data through the methods is described in Fig. 1 and the lo-
cations of the smaller study areas are shown in Fig. 2.
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Figure 1. The flow of data and information between the methods.
Figure 2. Map of maximum sand content at 80 cm depth for Eng-
land and Wales, with the study areas for the different methods, and
media-reported cascade failures, which are described in detail in
Appendix A.
2.1 Infrastructure network data
In order to calculate rates of infrastructure failure, it was nec-
essary to know the location and lengths of infrastructure net-
works. Road network data were available for England and
Wales from the Ordnance Survey OpenData (OS, 2016). The
water mains network (length approximately 43 000 km) was
available for East Anglia. Because the entire water network
for England and Wales was not available, it was necessary
to approximate the location of the national water network.
To do so, a comparison was made of the road network data
and water mains data in East Anglia. The length of water
mains in each soil map unit across the UK (Fig. 2) was then
estimated using the “A”, “B” and “Unclassified” roads from
the OS Open Roads data (OS, 2016) as a surrogate for na-
tional water mains. In East Anglia, this estimate results in
a 7 % underestimate of the length of pipe (39 669 km roads
vs. 43 000 km pipes). This error is sufficiently small for the
purposes of this research, and no spatial bias in the linear
infrastructure data was observed. In addition, as the water
mains data contain additional small lengths of “non-mains”
pipes to hydrants and washout legs, the actual underestimate
of mains pipes may be less than 7 %.
2.2 Infrastructure failure/condition data
Three types of infrastructure failure/condition data were used
in this study:
1. Road condition. Road Condition Index (RCI) data de-
scribing the quality of the road surface were available
for the county of Lincolnshire between 2008 and 2013.
2. Burst water mains. The location and reported dates for
50 901 burst water mains between 2004 and 2016 were
available for East Anglia.
3. Multi-infrastructure failures/societal impacts. 33
media-reported burst water mains which impacted other
infrastructure or society between 2009 and 2017 were
summarised and geocoded (Fig. 2 and Appendix A).
The preparation of these data is described in more detail
in the Methods section.
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2.3 Soil sand content maps
As the majority of water pipes are found at approximately
80 cm depth, maps of maximum soil sand content at 80 cm
depth were produced for England and Wales by reclassify-
ing the 1 : 250000 scale National Soil Map and Land Infor-
mation System (LandIS) data (Cranfield University, 2016).
Soil texture (the composition of sand, silt and clay) varies
with depth and across the national soil mapping units (which
comprise numerous soil types). The maximum sand content
within the soil mapping was chosen instead of the mean
to highlight areas with even small areas of sandy soil, and
to minimise the over-mapping of loamy soils which results
when soil textures in regional soil textures are averaged.
3 Methods
The interactions between the four methods, their study areas
and the data used are summarised in Figs. 1 and 2.
3.1 Method 1: The impact of burst water mains on
road surface quality
The impact of burst water mains on co-located roads was
investigated across the county of Lincolnshire (Fig. 1) for
which both road condition and water infrastructure data were
available. Annual (2008–2013) Road Condition Index (RCI)
SCANNER data were provided by highway engineers at the
County Council. RCI is measured on a scale from 0 (good
condition) to 315 (failed road) (Wallis, 2009; UK Roads
Board, 2011; Pritchard et al, 2014b, 2015b). Roads with
RCI > 100 require maintenance.
The road quality before, and after, reported burst mains
was compared. Each burst was buffered by 50 m to identify
the surveyed road segments under the “potential influence”
of the burst main (0–50 m, grey circles, Fig. 3), and an area
which was presumed “beyond influence” of the burst (50–
100 m, blue circles) but representative of similar soil and road
materials. RCI change from before to after a burst was calcu-
lated and analysed against soil sand content at 80 cm depth.
Both degraded road conditions (positive RCI) or improved
conditions (negative RCI) could indicate an impact from a
burst main. As most road surfaces are in less than perfect
condition, there are a number of scenarios in which a burst
may impact the road surface quality, both positively and neg-
atively. For example, an improved road surface may result
when a burst main significantly damages the road surface,
leading to an extensive repair to a large part of the road, in-
creasing the surface quality in this location. A degraded road
surface may result when a burst main does not damage the
road surface, but does cause subsurface cavitation. In this
case, the road may be undermined (even a number of me-
tres from the burst), which can lead to surface deformation.
In addition, road cutting to access the pipe will likely lead
to a decrease in surface quality. Finally, little change in road
surface quality might be expected when a burst main does
not damage the road surface or cause subsurface cavitation.
Here the only change should come from the impact of dig-
ging and reinstating the road. The impact here is dependent
on the quality of the workmanship.
Road Condition Index (RCI) data were not available for
all roads, in all years, and the opposite sides of the road
were typically surveyed on alternate years (Fig. 3). The road
condition survey area polygons are 10 m in length, but the
GIS (geographic information system) representation of these
lengths (inaccurately) extends well beyond the road footprint
(green polygons in Fig. 3). To minimise the impact of this
spatial inaccuracy, a count (rather than the area) of these
polygons was used, along with their RCI scores to calculate
a change in condition between the survey dates before and
after the burst.
3.2 Method 2: The impact of burst water mains on
other water mains
It is generally not possible to determine the causality of a
burst main from the location and date of burst. So, to gain
indications if bursts in sandier soils were more likely to trig-
ger subsequent proximal bursts, clusters of bursts were iden-
tified using expanding spatio-temporal windows (distances
of 2, 5, 10, 30 and 100 m and times of 1, 5, 10, 100 and
365 days). These windows were chosen to identify the differ-
ent failure patterns. For example, the smaller windows (e.g. 2
days, 5 m) may identify multiple bursts triggered directly by
the bursts, through force transmission down the pipe, sand
abrasion or failures triggered by a common cause. Longer
temporal windows may identify impacts stemming from sec-
ondary impacts or chronic conditions. For instance, a road
surface weakened from cutting to access the pipe, or due
to voids, may increase differential traffic-loading forces on
pipes and so increase the risk of failure. The number of burst
clusters were compared with maximum soil sand content at
80 cm. The rate of failure of all bursts per kilometre of pipe
by sand content was also calculated. A total of 50 901 bursts
from Anglian Water between 2004 and 2015 were used in the
analysis.
The rate of failure was calculated by dividing the number
of bursts in clusters by the total number of bursts in each sand
decile. By their nature, larger spatio-temporal windows have
higher rates of clusters. Therefore, for comparison, the rates
have been normalised by dividing the rate by the sum of all
the rates, for each panel in the graph (Fig. 5). The calculation
used is
normalised rate= (clusterss/burstss)/(6t(clusterst/burstst), (1)
where clusterss is the number of clustered bursts within
a sand decile, burstss the total number of bursts within a
sand decile, clusterst the total number of clustered bursts in
this spatio-temporal window and burstst the total number of
bursts in this spatio-temporal window (the whole dataset).
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Figure 3. Example region showing road sections which potentially have been influenced by a burst, and the similar road sections which are
presumed beyond the area of influence (Method 1a). Burst data are from the water company, and road data are from the local council.
3.3 Method 3: The impact of burst water mains on
other infrastructure and society
A meta-analysis of over 30 UK local media reports be-
tween 2009 and 2017 was employed to identify the com-
plex forms of failure arising from burst water mains. This
time period was chosen for the widespread availability of UK
web-based articles from this time. Google searches includ-
ing keywords such as “water main”, “burst”, “road”, “elec-
tricity”, “phone, “gas” and “sewer” provided articles. The
date and impacts of the burst mains were recorded (sum-
maries are provided in Appendix A). Burst locations were
estimated from the location descriptions in the articles and
were geocoded with www.gridreferencefinder.com (last ac-
cess: 13 September 2018). The geocoded data were imported
into ArcGIS and attributed with soil sand content.
Spatial bias may (or may not) occur in the locations of
the events, using this web search approach. For example, if a
particular newspaper has identified cascading failures in the
past, it may be more likely that they may report these is-
sues again. Conversely, if such failures happen weekly, these
events may be under-reported as they are no longer “news-
worthy”. Future research should consider accuracy assess-
ments of these approaches in more detail. In this scoping
study, the assumption of no spatial bias has been made. The
media articles are summarised in Appendix A.
3.4 Method 4: Cross-infrastructure workshop and 1 : 1
interviews
A single stakeholder workshop, involving representatives
spanning water, electricity distribution, gas distribution and
highway sectors, was used to elicit the key impacts of
burst water mains on other infrastructure. Workshop atten-
dees were predominantly asset or performance managers
or data specialists in their infrastructure organisations, or
infrastructure-focussed academics. The workshop employed
a trained facilitator and used a semi-structured experience-
sharing discussion format. Preliminary discussions focussed
on experiences of sand washout impacts on infrastructure as-
sets, service provision and risk management challenges. Af-
ter receiving experience sharing, initial results from early
data analysis were shared with the workshop and feedback
was received. Crucially, the workshop and interviews pro-
vided a framework for extracting infrastructure operators’
perspectives on cross-infrastructure impacts of burst mains.
Detailed notes of the discussions were made as opposed to
audio recordings because the experience of the authors has
found that workshops can result in poor quality audio, which
can be difficult to subsequently transcribe. Follow-up semi-
structured one-to-one interviews with workshop participants
further explored particular issues of interest. Interviews were
also held with local authority, rail and telecom representa-
tives who were unable to attend the workshop, and notes
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Figure 4. Comparison of the change in RCI before and after a burst water main (minus the mean RCI change for the circular sam-
ple area (Fig. 3). The numbers on the box plots represent the number of analysed road segments. Whiskers: range excluding outliers
(IQR± 1.5× IQR).
or audio recordings of the discussions were collected. Es-
tablished analytical methods were employed to analyse the
workshop notes and interview transcripts, with an interpre-
tive approach, based on inductive insights from the data used
(Sadana, 2013). This involved the manual coding of the data,
resulting in the inductive identification of key themes and
sub-themes. Details from these discussions are illustratively
incorporated in the results and discussions. For brevity, cita-
tions of comments from the workshops and interviews, and
the meta-analysis media articles, are omitted from the dis-
cussion text.
4 Results
The results of the methods are briefly described below and in
more depth in the Discussions. Where figures include error
bars, they show the 95 % confidence intervals for the Pois-
son mean. This interval is calculated by transforming a sym-
metric 95 % confidence interval (CI) for the logarithm of the
mean.
4.1 Method 1 results: The impact of burst water mains
on road surface quality
In East Anglia (Fig. 1), 93 % of minor (B) roads have pipes
within 16 m of the centre line of the road. Thus, it is logi-
cal that a failure in the pipe network will impact directly on
the road, through direct damage, subsurface void formation
or indirectly through road cutting to access and repair the
pipe. To test this, the change in road condition (RCI) was as-
sessed (prior to and after a burst) using annual road condition
surveys for 232 897 10 m road segments which were within
50 m of a burst main (potentially influenced) and 262 140
segments which were between 50 and 100 m from the same
bursts (deemed beyond influence of the burst) (Fig. 3).
The mean RCI change was approximately 0 (Fig. 4), with
a consistent interquartile range (IQR) for all roads, except
those within 50 m of a burst main and built on sandy (70 %–
90 %) soils. These showed greater spread in the change in
road condition, which may indicate that greater remedial
work is required to roads following a burst in sandy soils.
Because of the large number of observations, the difference
in the spread of the data is statistically significant. Even so,
the difference in the spread is not very large, so while it
does appear to support the scenarios of failure described in
Sect. 3.1, caution should be applied to drawing strong con-
clusions from this analysis in isolation.
4.2 Method 2 results: The impact of burst water mains
on other water mains
Using 50 901 burst water main records, the spatio-temporal
windows identified clusters for between 1 % (1 day, 2 m ra-
dius) and 45 % (365, 100 m radius) of the bursts. While the
smallest spatio-temporal window shows low rates of cascade
failure on sandy soils (annotation “a”, Fig. 5) the converse is
true for the largest spatio-temporal window (annotation “b”).
In addition, the high rate of bursts for low sand content soils
is apparent (annotation “c”). This may be indicative of com-
mon cause failures associated with clay soils (e.g. high cor-
rosivity or shrink–swell potential). These clusters in the low
sand content soils increase with expanding spatio-temporal
windows, reflecting the larger number of bursts in these cor-
rosive and movable soils. The bursts data used only show
independent repairs, so jobs to repair previous repairs which
have failed prematurely are excluded.
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 2951–2968, 2018 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/18/2951/2018/
T. S. Farewell et al.: How the impacts of burst water mains are influenced by soil sand content 2957
Figure 5. Normalised rate of burst cluster/all bursts, within expand-
ing spatio-temporal windows, by maximum soil sand content at
80 cm depth. Error bars: 95 % confidence interval for the Poisson
mean. Higher bars indicate more clusters of bursts per initial trig-
ger burst. For clarity, only 9 of the 25 spatio-temporal windows are
shown.
4.3 Method 3 results: The impact of burst water mains
on other infrastructure and society
The meta-analysis of media reports identified 33 multi-
infrastructure events across England and Wales between
2009 and 2017 (locations plotted in Fig. 2, and summarised
in Appendix A). The articles provided detailed information
on the impacts of burst mains on infrastructure and wider
society (e.g. school and hospital closures, length of traffic
delays, amount of bottled water delivered and the emotions
of those impacted by the events). The impacts of burst water
mains on infrastructure and wider society are summarised in
Fig. 6 and Table 1. Co-located roads and gas pipes were the
most commonly affected infrastructure.
The overall rate of bursts is only slightly controlled by soil
sand content. For example, the rate for the bands in Fig. 7
only ranges from 0.97 to 1.05 bursts per kilometre. However,
the meta-analysis of the media reports indicated that sand
content does play a controlling role in the likelihood that
an initial burst will go on to impact other infrastructure or
wider society. A substantially higher rate of media-reported
cascading infrastructure failures was observed in sandy soils
(Fig. 7).
Table 1. Summary of impacts on other infrastructure from burst wa-
ter mains (from analysis of media reports). Where reports indicate
a range (e.g. 8–11), this is due to uncertainty in the descriptions
provided by the article.
Infrastructure Reports Impacts
Road 21 Flooding, surface damage, sink-
holes (±vehicles in them), traffic
delays, closure.
Houses 10 Loss of water, loss of gas, flood-
ing, sewage flooding, evacuation,
subsidence, extensive cracking.
Gas 8–11 Loss of gas, fractured pipe, water
and sediment in gas
mains
Buildings 6 Flooding of county hall, schools
closed, hospital wards and ac-
cident and emergency (A+E)
department closed and patients
transferred. Shops closed. Lamp
posts unstable.
Sewers 3 Blocked sewers leading to foul
flooding. Pumping station filled
with sand. Tankers required to
pump sewage. Sewer collapse.
Raw sewage in garden.
Health 3 Health suffering due to cold ex-
posure. Sewage in gardens. A+E
closed, and patients moved. Toi-
lets out of action.
Electric 2–5 Loss of electronic payments. Fa-
cilities unable to open.
Water 2–3 Loss of water, second pipe repair
in close proximity.
Telecoms 2 Loss of phone and internet ser-
vices (including no credit card
payments at a supermarket for
many hours).
4.4 Method 4 results: Cross-infrastructure workshop
and 1 : 1 interviews
The workshop and interviews provided many detailed in-
sights into the hidden costs and pressures arising from burst
water mains. These impacts are also included in Fig. 6 and
aspects are described in more depth in the Discussion sec-
tion.
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Figure 6. Summary of impacts from burst water mains on other infrastructure and wider society. Schematic diagram based on analysis of 33
media reports, workshop discussions and interviews, showing impacts on other infrastructure and society. Line width represents the relative
frequency of the impact.
5 Discussion
This section combines discussions from all the methods.
Method 1 explored the impact of bursts on road surface qual-
ity, and Method 2 looked at the spatio-temporal clusters of
bursts by sand content. Limitations in the quantity, consis-
tency and spatio-temporal accuracy of other infrastructure
failure datasets did not allow cluster analysis for other in-
frastructure types. Method 3’s media meta-analysis and the
workshop/interviews of Method 4 revealed insights into the
wider impacts of water mains on other infrastructure that
were hidden from Method 1’s and 2’s spatial data analy-
sis of industry-reported failures. The media articles provided
in-depth details on the wider impacts on society (families,
schools, businesses etc.), albeit in a more sensational and
qualitative manner than other reporting methods. The work-
shop and interviews provided the behind-the-scenes views
from infrastructure operators on how large failure events im-
pact service delivery and repair processes. In the workshop,
network operators described cross-infrastructure failures as
low-frequency but moderately high-impact events. The im-
portance, and difficulty, of cross-infrastructure communica-
tion and co-working was identified (Dawson et al., 2016).
The value of cross-sector regional task groups was asserted
and many impacts on other infrastructure networks were dis-
cussed. Below, highlights of some of the common impacts on
key UK infrastructure types from burst water mains are pro-
vided. This is followed by a discussion on the impact of burst
mains on wider society and the implications of this work for
risk management. Finally, a brief discussion of the perfor-
mance of the mixed-methods approach is provided.
5.1 Roads
Flooding and damage to roads are common direct impacts
from co-located pipes (Table 1, Appendix A). Void formation
under the road surface can also impact safety (e.g. vehicles
falling through the road surface into voids). Minor and local
roads are more likely to be impacted by water mains failures
than major roads, as minor roads are more commonly under-
lain by water pipes and have a level of engineering reflective
of the lower levels of traffic. However, examples where ma-
jor roads have been impacted include a burst-formed void
under a road in Kent costing a water company GBP 640 000
in remediation, and causing a 25-day road closure. Burst
mains have also flooded motorways, causing significant dis-
ruptions.
Bursts in sandy soils appear to be slightly more likely to
change the road surface condition than bursts in other soil
types (Fig. 6). Even if the road is not damaged by the burst
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 2951–2968, 2018 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/18/2951/2018/
T. S. Farewell et al.: How the impacts of burst water mains are influenced by soil sand content 2959
Figure 7. Main figure: rate of media-reported cascade failures, normalised by estimated pipe length in each soil type. Error bars: 95 %
confidence interval for the Poisson mean. Top inset: estimated pipe length across England and Wales, by sand content. Bottom inset: number
of media-reported cascade failures, by sand content.
and water pressure, pipe repairs commonly require cutting of
the road surface to access the failed pipe. Highway author-
ities within England and Wales report that such cutting and
trenching impacts the structural integrity of the road, and po-
tentially reduces the road’s service life by 30 % (Asphalt In-
dustry Alliance, 2016). This was also reported independently
at the workshop and in the interviews. Cuts to the road sur-
face represent physical lines of weaknesses in a previously
solid, load-bearing surface, as well as the subsurface. Cuts
and trenches are well known to lead to subsequent potholes
or surface deformation features, including differential settle-
ment. It was reported by highway engineers that cut roads
not only have a shorter service life, with higher maintenance
costs, but also that cuts may be contributory factors to subse-
quent water pipe failures at the same location.
Where cavitation occurs over an extended period of time
(due to a small water leak from mains, or frequent infiltra-
tion/exfiltration of sewers), a commonly reported symptom
is road profile change, which can provide an early warning
of issues beneath the road. Multiple media reports described
how small road surface deformations were initially misdiag-
nosed and treated as simple surface failures, only for a larger
deformation or hole to appear the next day.
5.2 Ports and railways
Ports and railway stations represent critical access nodes for
international and national transport. The vulnerability of the
access routes to the ports of Felixstowe and Lowestoft was
discussed in the workshop, as parts of these key transport
routes are on sandy soil. If access roads are closed due to
cavitation from a burst main (or tidal surge, as occurred out-
side the Lowestoft train station in 2014), then access to the
ports/railway would be severely restricted. The economic and
transport consequences of port closures are severe. As well
as preventing access to these transport nodes, burst mains
can also affect railway infrastructure itself. In August 2016, a
burst water main contributed to the collapse of a railway em-
bankment and bridge in Leicestershire, disrupting rail jour-
neys for thousands of passengers for a number of days.
5.3 Gas distribution pipes
Gas pipes can be damaged by water mains as a result of
(1) the pressure of the water itself, (2) water and soil mixed
to an abrasive “sandblasting” slurry or indirectly through
(3) cavitation and subsequent damage by vehicles or road
surface collapse. Such failures commonly cause many hun-
dreds of houses to lose their gas supply (Appendix A).
The cost of repairs to gas pipes is reported to be insignif-
icant compared to the cost of removing water and sediment
from gas pipes. In some reported cases, up to 10 000 L of wa-
ter and debris needed to be pumped from the gas network.
Removing water and sediment is a complex process leav-
ing properties without gas for extended periods of time. In
one burst-triggered gas network failure, supplies to 250 cus-
tomers were lost for 7 days due to the valveless low-pressure
gas networks. These pipes required repeated digging (each
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time damaging the road) to (1) insert a camera to find the
blockages, (2) isolate the main, and then (3) physically iso-
late each property. There are additional regulator-imposed
charges associated with loss of service and potential health
risks for vulnerable people due to a lack of heating.
Workshop discussions also highlighted that health risks
are higher when, following a leak, gas enters a building. This
most often occurs through migration of gas through the soil
into houses, but also can occur when water enters a damaged
gas main. As more water enters the pipe, the gas pressure will
drop for short periods to a point at which some pilot lights on
domestic boilers can extinguish, leaving gas entering into un-
lit boilers. These types of failures are reported to be hard to
predict. Gas meters and boiler valves can also be damaged
by water and debris in the network, which bears additional
repair costs.
5.4 Buildings and houses
Public and private buildings are commonly impacted by wa-
ter mains failures, both directly (e.g. flooding or subsidence)
and indirectly through loss of services. In one burst near Bris-
tol, 8000 homes lost water supply for 3 days (Appendix A;
BBC, 2014a). Properties can also lose gas supply or expose
residents to risks. In one example, 25 homes were evacuated
due to a large gas leak. When sewers are blocked due to sed-
iment ingress, sewage can enter houses through the toilets.
Property subsidence has also been reported following a burst
main near a house on sandy soil as a result of cavitation. This
led to cracks opening up in the walls in the winter and health
impacts for the vulnerable residents were reported.
5.5 Other water mains
While multiple water mains failures were only specifically
reported three times in the media analysis, the GIS cluster
analysis identified that 2 %–3 % of bursts were co-located
with another burst within 5 m and 5 days of the original burst.
For clusters within 2 m and 1 day, a slightly higher rate of
failure was observed for pipes in the sandiest soils (Fig. 5, an-
notation “a”). A water company reported higher rates of mul-
tiple pipe failure due to sand abrasion for softer polyethylene
pipes than metallic pipes. Subsequent research could repeat
this method by looking at each pipe material (e.g. cast iron,
asbestos cement, PVC, polyethylene) in isolation to highlight
the impact of sand abrasion on the different pipe materials.
5.6 Sewers
Sewer impacts from burst mains include physical damage
to the sewer, leading to blockages and flooding by sewage
of roads and gardens. Such incidents are unpleasant and
carry associated health risks. When properties lose sewer-
age, tankers are required. As sewers do not require the same
structural integrity as gas and water mains and have joints ev-
ery few metres, they are vulnerable to exfiltration of sewage
and infiltration of water and particles. The change between
high and low external pressures can lead to void formation
around the sewer. Increased water pressures can come from
burst mains and natural events such as storm surges or high
rainfall events. Due to their non-cohesive texture, sandy soils
are more likely to be washed into the sewers than clays and
loams.
A water company that manages both water distribution and
sewerage networks reported that voids in sandy soils around
sewers are more problematic than around mains pipes. When
reported, voids can be filled with a resin. If left unchecked,
the structural integrity and flow pathways of the sewer can
suffer as the sewers settle into the void. This in turn can in-
crease the probability of a subsequent blockage, which can
in turn lead to sewer flooding.
5.7 Electrical distribution
Flooding from burst mains is a potential risk to urban elec-
tricity infrastructure, where substations and electrical equip-
ment are commonly located in basements or underground re-
cesses. One below-ground substation was reported to have
suffered two floods in 2 years resulting in GBP 1 million
costs and subsequent relocation of equipment. Any disrup-
tion to electricity supply can have wide impacts, including to
IT networks.
Impacts on electricity distribution networks from sand
washout events were less frequently identified, with 12 %
of media reports mentioning electricity distribution impacts.
An electrical distribution network operator attributed this low
impact rate to buried electricity cables having sufficient flex-
ibility to accommodate a loss of ground support and that
the higher voltage cables were buried at greater depth. How-
ever it was reported that older forms of lead-covered, paper-
insulated cables exhibit limited flexibility and are thus more
vulnerable. Another reason for the resilience of the electricity
networks is that they are reconfigurable, with supplies rarely
interrupted for more than a few seconds, anywhere other than
single-source nodes of the network.
Electric cables are most commonly damaged by “third
party strikes” when water companies and gas companies dig
down to repair or replace their assets. Notable advances have
been made by utilities to avoid these strikes and the associ-
ated risk to human life, and additional damage, but they still
do occur as the electric cables often sit on top of water mains.
5.8 Telecom cables
Telephone cables appear resilient to burst main impacts, pos-
sibly due to the prevalence of overhead lines in older resi-
dential areas (so co-location is not an issue). Only one ex-
ample of a burst main resulting in telephone disruption was
categorically identified by the media analysis. However, in
this instance, when the phone lines were cut off, a very large
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supermarket was prevented from accepting credit card pay-
ments until the lines were repaired.
5.9 The impacts of burst water mains on wider society
The socio-economic implications of burst mains range from
simple repairs of the infrastructure to more complex impacts
such as increased travel times, loss of work and disruption to
businesses through loss of footfall or disruptions to electronic
payments. If roads serving isolated communities are closed,
the impact of even a week of lost earnings can be catastrophic
for small businesses. Schools and hospitals (and many busi-
nesses) cannot open without water, and numerous examples
of such closures were identified. When schools close, there
is a subsequent impact on the local economy as many parents
cannot attend work that day.
Whilst health is rarely affected directly by burst mains,
secondary impacts were identified. Examples include closure
of hospital units and the movement of vulnerable patients to
other hospitals, raw sewage in gardens and subsidence lead-
ing to the formation of cracks in houses with associated heat
loss and implications for the health of older residents. When
gas mains are ruptured, houses may be evacuated to minimise
health impacts. When cars become trapped in holes in the
road there is potential for significant injury or death. While it
is the duty of infrastructure operators to minimise risk, there
are also longer term socio-economic and liability costs if hu-
man health is affected. Furthermore, any major disruption to
infrastructure service provision can result in public relations
and customer satisfaction impacts.
Road damage or flooding can extend travel times and dis-
tances and can result in reputational damage to the water and
highway operators. Diversions in rural areas of up to 48 km
were identified in the media analysis. Major voids will lead
to longer road closures and greater socio-economic impacts.
5.10 Implications of this research for risk management
Sand washout is not the most common, or damaging, soil-
related geohazard (Pritchard et al 2014a). However, due to
the distribution of sandy soils (Fig. 1), regional trends can be
observed. While some local authorities (particularly those in
sandy soil areas) have dedicated teams to address this issue,
most utilities only deal with these events on a case-by-case,
reactive, basis. Although some of the impacts of these events
have been considerable, it was noted by infrastructure opera-
tors that their low frequency make them difficult to consider
as part of many asset management plans.
Monitoring of infrastructure stability can incur substan-
tial costs and is often unfeasible across an entire network,
so reactive responses to infrastructure failures are common.
Nevertheless, it was noted that the use of soil maps and
other geohazard datasets to identify assets and communities
at risk from washout and other events would be a first step
most infrastructure organisations could take to identify (and
then potentially mitigate) their exposure to these risks. Such
maps can inform decision-making, help prioritise areas for
increased levels of maintenance or faster response times and
to inform asset management plans.
The infrastructure-provided failure data analysed did not
provide the severity or scale of the impact. One burst main
may cost a nominal amount to repair, but one which im-
pacts on other infrastructure systems can have significant
costs associated. Each burst, irrespective of its impact, is
currently represented by one record each in the company
bursts database. Utilities may wish to record the severity and
scale/cost of the impact in their relational spatial databases to
identify areas of their network which commonly are more ex-
pensive to fix. The importance of collecting and maintaining
highly accurate spatial data for assets and failures is asserted,
if later data analysis is to be undertaken and meaningful re-
sults provided to inform future decision-making.
Information sharing around infrastructure interdependen-
cies between utilities is often only undertaken on a “need to
know” basis. This is particularly true where issues of com-
mercial confidentiality and/or national security apply, for ex-
ample to national critical infrastructure. Because of a focused
remit on their own infrastructure, low levels of information
sharing on environmental hazards and risks occurs even be-
tween similar networks in the same geographic region. How-
ever, many countries are seeing a transition towards large
parent companies owning multiple utility companies (e.g.
in the UK, Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Limited
largely owns Northern Gas Networks, Northumbrian Water
and UK Power Networks, and also owns a strategic stake in
the Southern Water Group). As a result, where appropriate,
information sharing between these companies operating in
the same area is encouraged by the parent company. Indepen-
dent operators working in similar regions may take part in lo-
cal infrastructure groups or national infrastructure resilience
networks.
Many utilities stated that their awareness of systemic vul-
nerabilities, risks and interdependencies was less than ideal,
and expressed their desire to better understand the societal
risks beyond that of their own network concerns and liabil-
ities. A desire for greater quantification of the impacts of
these type of low-frequency events on levels of service and
resilience was expressed, as the predominant focus is on the
reduction of high-likelihood, high-impact risks. While this
research begins to address these desires, there is potential for
a more thorough analysis of these types of failures, using and
building on the approaches used in this research. UK-wide
data on water mains bursts are being collected in the National
Failures Database, held by the UK Water Industry Research
Organisation. Similar databases for other infrastructure com-
munities would be of value. The consideration of lower like-
lihood, moderate-impact risks is being encouraged by the UK
water regulator Ofwat in their Resilience in the Round docu-
mentation (Ofwat, 2017)
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5.11 Assessments of the mixed-methods approach
This scoping study sought to describe and begin to quantify
the impacts of burst mains on other infrastructure and society.
A mixed-methods approach, rather than a pure GIS data anal-
ysis of reported infrastructure faults and failures, was used,
and the value of the details provided by the meta-analysis
of media reports and expert knowledge distilled from work-
shops and interviews quickly became apparent.
The spatial data analysis quantified the control of soil on
the impacts of burst mains on road surface quality (Method 1)
and on the likelihood of subsequent bursts (Method 2). How-
ever, the unavailability and/or inaccuracy of many infrastruc-
ture datasets did not permit the desired identification of many
cascading infrastructure failures in this approach. While data
are now being collected on the duration and number of prop-
erties impacted by water supply interruptions, the industry-
reported burst data used in this research data did not describe
wider societal impacts, nor the scale or cost of the failures.
The industry GIS data were usually restricted to the loca-
tion, date and repair type undertaken. In contrast, the meta-
analysis of media reports (Method 3, impacts summarised in
Appendix A) provided qualitative descriptions of both infras-
tructure failures and the impacts on health, economy and peo-
ple. Because media reports tend to focus on the larger bursts,
the impacts are not representative of all bursts. However,
analysis of these reports identified that the rate of these dra-
matic failures per 1000 km pipes is higher in areas of sandy
soils (Fig. 4). Because of the depth of information gleaned
from this approach, media meta-analysis is encouraged for
other studies of low-frequency, moderate-impact local envi-
ronmental risks. Further work on the removal of any spa-
tial bias from such reporting is recommended. Social media
feeds may also serve as a crowdsourced dataset for identify-
ing these types of failure. The workshop and one-to-one in-
terviews with infrastructure owners and operators (Method 4)
captured detailed perspectives on these cascading infrastruc-
ture failures and their impact on service delivery, costs, re-
sponses and management plans. The combination of these
methods led to more quantifiable, descriptive and useful re-
sults than would have been possible if each method was used
in isolation.
6 Conclusions
Diverse examples of the cross-infrastructure impacts from
burst water mains have been identified and discussed. Cas-
cading infrastructure failures, while occurring in many soil
types, appear to be more than 3 times as common in soils
with high sand content (Fig. 7). While the investigations un-
dertaken in this research have focussed on areas within the
UK, the same principles will apply in any country where
sandy soils are present (e.g. Majid et al., 2010). The types
of failures described tended to be low-frequency, moderate-
impact events. Due to asset co-location, roads and gas pipes
are the infrastructures most commonly affected by burst wa-
ter mains (Fig. 6). There are substantial direct and indirect
economic costs of these events.
The impact of burst water mains on other infrastructure
can be long-lasting (e.g. reduction in the structural integrity
of a road) or costly to repair (e.g. removing water and sedi-
ment from a flooded gas network). Burst mains can also im-
pact on the wider society, disrupting healthcare, increasing
travel times or closing local businesses, government oper-
ations and schools. The costs of these societal impacts are
rarely quantified and are typically borne by affected individ-
uals. Wider discussions around cascading failures are of rel-
evance to regional infrastructure and resilience groups.
The research illustrates the potential value of mixed-
methods approaches to investigate such complex infrastruc-
ture hazards and risks. The geospatial data analysis of in-
frastructure failures provided insufficient information to fully
address questions about the impact of burst mains on proxi-
mal infrastructure and society. In contrast, the meta-analysis
of local news stories provided rich information relating to
the cascading impacts of burst water mains. Furthermore,
the direct input from infrastructure operators through the
workshop and interviews obtained valuable information on
their views on these risks to their infrastructure resilience.
Thus, the authors believe that mixed-methods approaches
holds great potential for infrastructure research, but such ap-
proaches do require careful development and evaluation. To
benefit more from these approaches, infrastructure operators
are encouraged to improve the spatio-temporal accuracy of
their failure/condition mapping and the speed to which the
data on these failures are made available throughout the com-
pany.
Marker (1998) argued that earth science is generally un-
derused in spatial planning. Twenty years later, the comment
can be restated. Soil maps, similar to those used in this re-
search, can help infrastructure companies identify assets in
soils vulnerable to sand washout and other more common
soil-related geohazards (Pritchard et al., 2014a). Clear iden-
tification of the hazards present in a local area will enable
informed decision-making. Vulnerable assets can be identi-
fied, assessed and repaired or proactively replaced to min-
imise cascading impacts.
Data availability. This study reanalysed data from a number
of sources, with varying levels of accessibility. The details
of the media-reported multi-infrastructure failures are provided
in Appendix A. The soil data are available under licence
at http://www.landis.org.uk (Cranfield University, 2018). The
road data are openly accessible at https://www.ordnancesurvey.
co.uk/business-and-government/products/os-open-roads.html (OS,
2016). Due to the commercially sensitive nature of the infrastructure
data, it is not openly accessible. Enquiries regarding the data gener-
ated in this study should be sent to researchdata@cranfield.ac.uk.
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 2951–2968, 2018 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/18/2951/2018/
T. S. Farewell et al.: How the impacts of burst water mains are influenced by soil sand content 2963
Appendix A
Table A1. Summary of the media-reported multiple infrastructure
failures. Sand % is the maximum soil sand content at 80 cm depth.
ID Date (d/m/yr) Sand % Summary of media report URL
1 23/02/2009 93 15 cm PVC main burst. Damaging road surface. Po-
lice involved. 69 houses off water. Fire engine called




2 02/11/2009 80 A main road and footpath in Lincoln are closed for 2
days after a burst water main.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/lincolnshire/
8337851.stm (BBC, 2009)
3 06/10/2011 95 Burst main – car fell through road. Closed road leading
to gridlock. 100 m of road to be reinstated. 30 cm main.




4 27/09/2012 95 Ground collapsed under car, driver missed work. Lamp
post unstable, electic supply isolated. Water supplies to
area affected. Schools in Chertsey and Woking closed.
Centre for disabled kids and adults closed. Extensive




5 10/10/2012 87 Burst water main. Void formation – driveway collapse
and household subsidence. Cold air coming through
cracks, with claimed health impacts. Insurance loss ad-




6 20/12/2012 47 Burst main. Closed road to facilitate repairs. Also dam-
aged electricity duct. Found second water leak. Interim




7 06/04/2013 23 Burst main forms a void under road into which a Severn
Trent van falls, cracking a gas pipe and leading to the
evacuation of 25 homes. Tens of thousands of pounds of
flood damage. Roads closed for many days. Local coun-
cil records flooding and offices closed for many days.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-england-derbyshire-22050687 (BBC, 2013b)
8 26/04/2013 11 Burst main closes main road in Swindon for many days.
30 m of road surface damaged by burst main (30 cm).
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-england-wiltshire-22312127 (BBC, 2013a)
9 01/11/2013 92 Burst main (caused by BT contractors). Floods 90
homes, 9 flats and retirement homes. Fire crews in-
volved – bottled water supplied. 30 gas company staff
involved. Gas supplies cut to 86 homes, removed
10 000 L of water from the gas network. Lots of sand
in pipes too – complex engineering process to vacuum




10 06/01/2014 87 100-year-old large burst main – thousands of people off
water. Significant road damage (A6). Road closed for
more than a week. Busy commuter route near M1.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-england-leicestershire-25619109 (BBC, 2014a)
11 16/01/2014 87 Huge pipe burst. Vast amount of water – flooding area
the size of a football pitch. Brown water in supply. Sec-









13 09/04/2014 95 38 cm main burst. Traders, charities and community
centres closed, especially those with toilets, and cafes.
Delays to repair of water supply because of a large elec-
tronic sign in a concrete plinth with a power cable ris-
ing through the middle, requiring specialist teams. Res-
idents requested not to use dishwasher or washing ma-




14 13/04/2014 64 Car stuck in hole on A320. No disruption to water sup-
ply. Water company paying car insurance claim. Resur-
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Table A1. Continued.
ID Date (d/m/yr) Sand % Summary of media report URL
15 17/04/2014 64 Another car in A320 hole. 38 cm Victorian main. Local
traffic congestion. PR issues now because of repeated




16 12/06/2014 88 1.2 m× 1.2 m void under road. Not sure if it is caused
by gas leak, or if the void caused the gas leak. Road
closed for a number of days. Gas smelled for a month




17 22/08/2014 39 Burst main breaks gas pipes and flooded gas network.
755 properties with no heating or hot water for days.
100 000 L of water removed so far. 150 properties off
gas for extended period. Distributing fan heater and
warming plates. Working with local authority social ser-





18 26/09/2014 23 Large diameter main (76 cm) burst. 8000 homes without
water. 18 schools closed. Bristol Water and Red Cross
handing out water. 19 people rescued by dinghy, and




19 28/09/2014 95 Burst main floods gas pipe. 650 houses off gas. 80 000 L
of water removed from gas network. Significant dam-
age to gas meters and appliances. Gas company sup-
plied electric hobs and heaters to affected homes. Set
up a customer centre at the local church.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-england-dorset-29362291 (BBC, 2014d)
20 30/09/2014 0 Burst main floods gas network. 297 houses off gas.





21 04/10/2014 87 Burst water main. Major incident declared at Scun-
thorpe Hospital. No drinking water and toilet flushing




22 14/10/2014 88 Burst main leads to void under road. Car becomes stuck
in hole. Both lanes closed. Many roads in Walton grid-




23 04/11/2014 11 Gas network flooded with water. 400 homes affected,
some for more than 2 days. Engineers required to carry
out safety checks, and reconnect gas. Customers off gas
for 24+ hours are financially compensated.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-england-dorset-29929187 (BBC, 2014c)
24 18/11/2014 87 Burst main – sandy torrent of water, flooded three
homes, turned road into “sodden beach”. Water up to
knee height – water up to 1 m high in houses. No water.
No power. Road blocked for repair by police. Fire crews




25 28/11/2014 93 Burst main fixed rapidly, but road remains closed to al-





26 09/01/2015 0 5× 3.5× 1 m deep sinkhole in garden from burst main.
Destroyed pavement and garden. Began as a small hole
in kerb. County Council called, but no one came so po-
lice called. Police put up barriers. The next day, huge
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Table A1. Continued.
ID Date (d/m/yr) Sand % Summary of media report URL
27 26/01/2015 76 Burst main floods allotments. Complex fix as gas pipes
and power cables close to water main. 15 cm main.





28 27/01/2015 72 Road closed for 3 days after burst cause road to col-
lapse. Tree has fallen into hole. Ten houses off water for
6 h, but took much longer to fix the pipe, as the actual





29 29/01/2015 40 Burst pipe. Flooding of five homes. Cut electricity sup-
ply and telephone lines. Bad PR for Yorkshire Water.
http://www.thetelegraphandargus.co.uk/news/local/
airelocal/11757812.Residents_face_flood_after_pipe_
gives_out/ (Telegraph & Argus, 2015)
29 29/01/2015 40 Continuing from above: many gardens full of debris.
Main road flooded with stones and debris. Cut out BT
telecoms base – no phone/internet for several hours in
Shipley and Baildon. No credit card payments at ASDA
supermarket. Both fire and police involved. Sandbags
provided for people who need them. Rehoming for
those who required it. Emergency electrical work car-






30 03/02/2015 67 Burst main closes road. Water coming out of BT man-
hole. Water flowed onto carriageway and froze. Traffic





31 04/02/2015 89 Mains bursts. Floods roads. Blocks sewers. Debris
washing towards main road roundabout. Gas leak. Fire
crew and local council workers both involved to un-




32 06/02/2015 86 Taxi stuck in 1.5 m wide pothole caused by burst water




33 08/05/2015 40 60 cm hole in road. Caused by burst main or “drainage




34 19/11/2015 100 1.8× 2.7 m wide, 1.8 m deep void. Destroyed road.
Gardens flooded with sewage. Cascading failure dam-
ages proximal water mains (more bursts) and sewers
(damage). Sewage pumping stations no longer work-
ing as sand and gravel in the pumps. Exposes gas pipes.
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